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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY: A NEW GENERATION OF INTERDISCIPLINARY
SCHOLARSHIP
By Anne-Marie Slaughter,Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood*
INTRODUCrION

Nine years ago, Kenneth Abbott published an article exhorting international lawyers
to read and master regime theory, arguing that it had multiple uses for the study of
international law.' He went as far as to call for a "joint discipline" that would bridge
the gap between international relations theory (IR) and international law (IL). Several
years later, one of us followed suit with an article mapping the history of the two fields
and setting forth an agenda forjoint research. 2 Since then, political scientists and international lawyers have been reading and drawing on one another's work with increasing
frequency and for a wide range of purposes. Explicitly interdisciplinary articles have
won the Francis Dedk Prize, awarded for the best work by a younger scholar in this
Journal,for the past two years running;4 the publication of an interdisciplinary analysis
of treaty law in the HarvardInternationalLaw Journalprompted a lively exchange on the
need to pay attention to legal as well as political details;5 and the Hague Academy of
International Law has scheduled a short course on international law and international
relations for its millennial lectures in the year 2000. Further, the American Society of
International Law and the Academic Council on the United Nations System sponsor
joint summer workshops explicitly designed to bring young IR and IL scholars together
to explore the overlap between their disciplines.
On the IR side of the ledger, the "I word" is no longer taboo.6 The institutionalist
research agenda has risen in prominence, dictating dissertation topics and dominating
* Anne-Marie Slaughter is J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law,
Harvard Law School; Andrew S. Tulumello is a Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, spring 1998; and Stepan
Wood is Assistant Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
The authors would like to thank Tamar Shapiro for research assistance, as well as participants at a conference
on international law and international relations at Yale Law School in October 1997 for valuable comments
on an earlier draft. We are also indebted to two anonymous reviewers for the AJIL.
1See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
2
Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AJIL 205
(1993).
One measure of this trend, albeit a crude and mechanical one, is a marked increase in cross-citations. A
LEXIS/NEXIS search conducted in December 1997 revealed 41 citations to ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLrriCAL ECONOMY (1984), in the legal literature. Thirtynine of these citations appear in articles published after 1993, even though After Hegemony was published in
1984. Similarly, the term "regime theory" has been used 44 times since 1994, although only 6 times between
1990 and 1994; "Institutionalism" has been referred to 40 times after 1994, as compared to 6 between 1990
and 1994. Abbott's Prospectus, published in 1989, has been cited 91 times, 34 since 1995; Slaughter's Dual
Agenda, published in 1993, has been cited 56 times, 38 since 1995 and 29 since 1996. The term "epistemic
communities," an important concept for some segments of the IR community, has been cited 30 times in the
legal literature since 1990, 23 of them since 1993. Even political Realism, in its classical Thucydidean variant,
is experiencing
a modest revival, with 13 references since 1990, 10 of which were after 1994.
4
Jutta Brunne & StephenJ. Toope, Environmental Security and FreshwaterResources:Ecosystem Regime Building,
91 AJIL 26 (1997); Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of
InternationalWater Resources Law, 90 AJIL 384 (1996).
'John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspectiveon Treaties: A Synthesis ofInternationalRelations Theory and International
Law, 37 HARv. INT'L LJ. 139 (1996); Michael Byers, Taking the Law out of InternationalLaw: A Critique of the
Iterative Perspective, 38 HAIRV. INT'L LJ.201 (1997).
"ABRAM CHAiLEs & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAES, THE NEW SOvEREIGNTY 2 n.3 (1995).
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important journals. A team of international relations scholars specializing in law has
published an anthology of readings designed to set forth IR and IL approaches to
international rules.7 And Robert Keohane, the international relations scholar most responsible for the rise of Institutionalism, gave the 1996 Sherrill Lecture at Yale Law
8
School on "International Relations and International Law: Two Optics."
The purpose of this article is to take stock of this growing interdisciplinary literature,
much of which is collected in the bibliography. Our stock taking, however, is intended
to be more than mere inventory. It is designed both to identify avenues that have been
explored and to canvass promising new directions ofjoint research. We begin from the
premise that it is time to move beyond canonical narratives of how the disciplines evolved,
both separately and in conjunction with each other. These narratives are valuable both
as intellectual history, providing necessary context for current debates, and as bulwarks
against ad hoc borrowing of terms and concepts. But it is time to move on.
It is equally important to move beyond the presentation and self-presentation of one
discipline to the other. Virtually all of the recent efforts to urge international lawyers to
engage in more interdisciplinary scholarship have looked to different paradigms or
schools of IR theory that political scientists themselves use in surveying their field.
Kenneth Abbott emphasized the value of regime theory, now generally referred to as
Institutionalism, 9 for international lawyers; Anne-Marie Slaughter reviewed Neo-Realism
°
and Institutionalism but focused particularly on the uses of liberal theory;' Harold Koh
and Friedrich Kratochwil have explored the value of constructivist approaches." On the
IR side, a spate of recent anthologies and special journal issues accept and entrench
3
these divisions, reviewing Realism,' 2 pitting Neo-Realism against Neo-Liberalism, de4
nouncing the "false promise" of Institutionalism, clarifying the sources and common
6
themes of Liberalism,15 and reviewing "new thinking" in each of these categories.
This essay avoids further restatement of theoretical paradigms and instead examines
the ways that international legal scholars are actually using IR theory and empirical
research in their scholarship. What analytical tasks are international lawyers asking IR
theory to perform? Can we classify these diverse explorations and uses of IR theory in
theoretically or practically fruitful ways? Moreover, do legal scholars conceive of interdisciplinarity as a one- or two-way street? Are they borrowing methods or concepts from IR
to fill perceived inadequacies in legal analysis? Or are they attempting to engage IR
theory in a dialogue that aims at challenging or developing existing ideas and techniques
7 INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Robertj.
Beck, Anthony C. Arend & Robert D. Vander Lugt eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL RULEs].
8
Robert O. Keohane, InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L LJ.487 (1997).
9See Abbott, supra note 1.
'0See Slaughter, supra note 2; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6
EuR.J. INT'L L. 503 (1995).
"1See Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw? 106 YALE LJ. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh,
Why ObeyI; Harold H. Koh, TransnationalLegalProcess,75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, TransnationalProcess]. FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMs, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRAcTICALAND

LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL REiATIONSAND DOMESTIc AFFAIRS (1989), prefigured much of the current

constructivist work on international law.
12THE PERILS OF ANARCHY. CONTEMPORARY REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

(Michael E. Brown, Sean

M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1995).
3
' NEO-REAIUSM AND NEO-LIBERALISM: THE CoNTEMPORARY DEBATE (David A. Baldwin ed., 199:3).
4
Winter 1994-95,

at
' SeeJohnJ. Mearsheimer, The FalsePromise ofInternationalInstitutions, INT'L SECURITY,
5 (arguing that institutions cannot prevent war by changing state behavior); Promises, Promises: CanInstitutions
Deliver? INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1995, at 39 (responses to Mearsheimer by Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin,
Charles Kupchan, Clifford Kupchan, John Ruggie & Alexander Wendt); John J. Mearsheimer, A Realist Reply,
id. at 82.
15SeeAndrew Moravcsik, TakingPreferencesSeriously: A Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitcs,51 INT'L ORG. 513
(1997).
NIw THINKING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (Michael W. Doyle & G. John Ikenberry eds., 1997).
'6

1998]

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

on questions of common concern to members of both disciplines? Or both? Finally,
what does the rapidly expanding corpus of recent IR/IL scholarship suggest about
directions for future research?
We begin by looking at how international lawyers have brought IR theory to bear on
the analysis of international law and institutions. We identify three ways that lawyers are
using materials and insights from IR theory: to diagnose substantive problems and frame
better legal solutions; to explain the structure or function of particular international
legal rules or institutions; and to reconceptualize or reframe particular institutions or
international law generally. Some of these projects have yielded more fruitful and promising results than others, but in all of them international legal scholars are revealed less
as passive consumers using IR theory to reinvigorate their own discipline than as active
theorists and problem solvers in their own right, using whatever analytical tools best suit
their purposes.
In the same vein, we examine a variety of ways that international legal scholars have
reasserted or reaffirmed the value of their own discipline as an equal partner in interdisciplinary studies. To the extent that some proponents of interdisciplinary scholarship saw
IL as a patient and IR as the cure, the patient is alive and kicking (or, to stretch the
metaphor, is no longer a patient but a professional colleague). Specifically, many lawyers
(and a number of political scientists) are newly insisting on the importance of law as an
explanatory factor in the analysis of state behavior in the international system. They are
also actively seeking to explain the precise mechanisms or pathways by which legal rules
shape not only political outcomes but also actors and social structures. Finally, legal
scholars chide political scientists for focusing too much on structures and not enough
on process.
We next develop an interdisciplinary research agenda. We identify three themes
around which IL and IR scholars are converging: international governance, social construction and liberal agency. This focus on substantive themes cross-cuts established
paradigms and self-defined disciplinary boundaries and leads to six clusters of research
questions on which a collaborative research agenda might be built. These six clusters
fall under the headings of regime design, process design, discourse on the basis of shared
norms, transformation of the constitutive structures of international affairs, government
networks and embedded institutionalism.
Finally, an important caveat is in order. Any attempt to map a field, however loosely,
is bound to be both exclusionary and subjective. Many scholars who may consider themselves to be drawing on or speaking to both disciplines, or at least addressing problems
central to both disciplines, may be surprised to find that their work is not reviewed
here. Such omissions are likely to be particularly noticeable with respect to scholarship
produced before the mid-1980s or more recent work that eschews the dominant vocabulary of contemporary U.S. IR theory.1 7 Within these limits, then, this essay reviews recent
literature that explicitly uses a number of contemporary theoretical approaches in IR to
address problems of interest to both IR and IL.'8
Part I reflects briefly on some of the reasons for the most recent flowering of IR/IL
scholarship. Part II reviews how international lawyers are drawing on international relations scholarship. Part III explores the ways international lawyers are reaffirming the
importance of law in these interdisciplinary projects. Part IV sets forth an integrated
research agenda.
1

7 This vocabulary signals self-conscious use of common theoretical frameworks, facilitating active or passive
collaboration on issues of interest to both disciplines. At the same time, however, such collaboration will
not be possible or desirable on many issues that each discipline is likely to claim as its own.
", We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for a thoughtful discussion of the broader spectrum of
interdisciplinary work. Any remaining errors of omission or commission are our own.
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I. EXPLAINING THE INTEREST IN INTERDISCIPLINARY SCHOLARSHIP

Our first task is to explain the increased interest in interdisciplinary collaboration
among members of both disciplines. Why are international lawyers turning in increasing
numbers to IR for theoretical models, methodological tools, policy prescriptions or
empirical data? And why are an increasing number of IR theorists again considering
international law and formal international organizations worthy of serious attention?
These steps toward interdisciplinary collaboration may be understood on several levels.
We briefly explore two types of explanation. At one level, the interest in interdisciplinary
collaboration may be understood as the result of responses by members of each discipline
to developments in the external environment they seek to explain and shape. At another
level, the interest in interdisciplinary scholarship may be understood in terms of intellectual dynamics internal to each discipline.
First, IR and IL scholars seem increasingly to see the same world outside their office
windows. One of the things they see is a proliferation of formal institutions for international cooperation. Governments conduct a large and growing proportion of their foreign affairs, in an ever-increasing range of issue-areas, through a wide variety of formal
agreements and organizations. 19 In response, IR theorists are much more interested in
the form of international institutions, or rather, the difference that form makes. 20 Further, much institutionalized cooperation has taken an increasingly "legalized," "judicialized" or constitutional form. The most striking story in this regard remains "the community of law" constructed by the European Court ofJustice together with national courts
of the European member states,2 ' but various other international regimes, from the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to the North American Free Trade Agreement
22
(NAFTA), to the World Bank, depend increasingly on legal dispute mechanisms.
Second, both IR and IL scholars are witnessing a competing trend in international
life, signaled by the rise of a group of phenomena most often explained in terms of
"globalization," "transnationalism" or the "new medievalism." These include the emergence and increasing importance of substate and nonstate actors, increasing international economic and political interdependence, the perceived transformation or disintegration of state sovereignty, the ascendancy of difficult "global" issues that require
coordinated responses, and the continuing financial and administrative crises of the
United Nations Organization. In this increasingly complicated environment, students
of international order are embracing international "governance" as an alternative to
9
But see Cheryl Shanks, Harold K. Jacobson & Jeffrey H. Kaplan, Inertia and Change in the Constellation of
InternationalGovernmental Organizations,1981-1992,50 INT'L ORG. 593 (1996) (arguing that, within the general
trend of increasing international cooperation, formal organizations have stopped proliferating).
. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through FormalInternationalOrganizations,42
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1998); MULTILATERAUISM MATTERS: THE THEORYAND PRAxIS OFAN INSTITuTIONAL FORM
(John G. Ruggie ed., 1993); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some InternationalAgreementsInformal? 45 INr'L ORG. 495
(1991); Friedrich Kratochwil &John G. Ruggie, InternationalOrganization:A State of the Art on the Art of the State,
40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986).
21 The classic account remainsJoseph H. H. Weiler, The TransformationofEurope, 100 YALE LJ. 2403 (1991).
For a review of much of the legal and political science literature on the ECJ, and a definition of the elements
of a community of law, see Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273, 290-93, 366-70 (1997).
' The transformation of the GATT dispute resolution process from one that relies principally on political
negotiation to a much more formal legal process in which the disputants present claims before a binding
third-party tribunal has focused attention onjudicialization as a wider phenomenon. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec,
The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND T.ANSPARENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9 (Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Steger eds., 1992); John H. Jackson, The Legal Meaning
of a GATTDispute Settlement Report: Some Reflections, in TOWARDS MoRE EFacrIVE SUPERVISION BYINTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS 149 (Niels Blokker & Sam Muller eds., 1994);
Alec Stone Sweet, judicializationand the Construction of Governance, J. COMP. POL. STUD. (forthcoming April
1999) (on file with authors); see also David Lopez, Dispute Resolution UnderNAF'A: Lessonsfrom theEarlyExperience,
32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997).
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international "government," the traditional liberal internationalist ideal of formal international institutions displacing domestic sovereigns in specific issue-areas. International
governance is understood as the formal and informal bundles of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and nonstate actors in internato IR definitions of international regimes
tional affairs23-an idea whose resemblance
24
coincidence.
no
is
or institutions
Third, emphasizing governance over government tends to highlight the advantages of
"soft law" over "hard law." Supranational institutions may not always be able to promulgate
and enforce law, but they can and do frequently generate norms that are disseminated by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to pressure domestic political actors. Many of these
NGOs are the international analogues of U.S. public interest groups, skilled in the ways of
using law to promote social change, however slowly and imperfectly.25
Finally, the fascination with compliance continues. Louis Henkin's celebrated observation that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost
all of their obligations almost all of the time" 26 continues to tantalize. Political scientists
and international lawyers who have responded most recently to the challenge of demonstrating and explaining this claim include Oran Young, Thomas Franck, Abram and
Antonia Chayes, and Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Jacobson. Chayes and Chayes
develop a "managerial theory" of compliance that draws explicitly on legal theory deemphasizing punitive enforcement of law and on IR theory highlighting the functional
dimensions of regimes in facilitating cooperation.2 8 Harold Koh and Beth Simmons are
independently working on book-length studies of "why nations obey. ' 29 Starting from
the vantage point of their respective disciplines, each is self-consciously using an interdisciplinary approach.
The new enthusiasm for interdisciplinary collaboration may also be understood partially as the product of intellectual dynamics within each discipline. The turn to international relations theory in international law must be situated within a more general
interdisciplinary trend, generating a host of "law and. . ." initiatives. For some, the
turn to social science, with its parsimonious causal theories and emphasis on observed
behavior, can be understood as a response to law's perceived "reality deficit." 30 To
paraphrase Annalise Riles, law is incomplete and turns to social science for completion
in the form of a connection to concrete social practices.31 From this perspective, interna' See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, The World Trade Organization, and the Liberal
Project to RerrmceptualizeInternationalLaw, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 1, 27 (1994); COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD

(1995).

I' Much of the energy behind the recent turn to "governance" in public international law has come from IR
theory. See, e.g., ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOvERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS
SoCiTIy (1994) [hereinafter YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANcE]; Oran R. Young, Introduction: The Effeciveness of InternationalGovernance Systems, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
1 (Oran Young et al. eds., 1996); GOvERNANCE WrrHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDERAND CHANGE IN WORLD POLrICS
(James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
- See Harold H. Koh, TransnationalPublicLaw Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991).
""Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 42 (1968).
7 ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AuTHORrl. A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS
(1979); THOMAS M. FRANcK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); CHAYEs & CHAYES, supra
note 6; ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING ENVIRONMENTAL AccoRDs (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.
Jacobson eds., 1997).
" CHuir.S & CHAY.Es, sura note 6.
"See Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11; Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment and Compliance: International
Law and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes, paper delivered at Conference on Domestic Politics and
International Law, St Helena, Cal. (June 4-7, 1997) (on file with authors).
" See Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map of Social Scientific Approaches to the Concept of Law, 15 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 501, 512 (1995).
' Annalise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity,1994 U. ILL.
L. REv. 597, 633-36, 649-50; see alsoGunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a ConstructivistEpistemology
of Law, 23 L. & Soc'Y REv. 727, 743, 745 (1989).
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tional law is particularly susceptible to the siren call of social science, as it struggles
perpetually with suspicions'of its own irrelevance. 2
For others, the integration of IR and IL scholarship is an affirmation of IL as both
intellectual and practical enterprise. It is the natural corollary of the indivisibility of law
and politics. Proponents of this approach equate the relationship between IL and IR
with the relationship between constitutional law and comparative politics, insisting that
normative efforts to induce or change behavior rest on explicitly articulated assumptions
about the causes or nature of that behavior. 3 These two approaches are helping to fuel
a lively intradisciplinary debate within IL.
On the IR side, we similarly can sketch the developments that led to the current revival
of interest in formal institutions and international law. First, as noted in the introduction,
Institutionalism has emerged as the dominant theoretic paradigm in the North American
IR academy. Many institutionalists and realists have converged upon assumptions and
questions comprising a "rationalist" research program. 4 Their common commitment
to identifying and explaining the conditions for cooperation among rational egoists,
whatever form that cooperation might take, has overshadowed realism's traditional hostility to international law. Institutionalist IR theorists have thus begun to give international
law and formal organizations serious attention. Moreover, IR scholars are collaborating
directly with international lawyers, 6 and some have joined in calling for ajoint research
agenda. 7
Second, significant segments of the IR academy, particularly the so-called English
school3 8 and U.S. "international organizations" specialists,3 9 have always accorded international law and organizations a central place in their research and scholarship. These
traditions have enjoyed something of a revival in the American IR academy in recent
years as interest in formal institutions has increased.
2

See Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioningof InternationalLaw: An

Intermediate View, in THE RELEvANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 142 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann
eds., 1968); see also THOMAS M. FRANcK FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTUTIONS 25 (1995).
x See Slaughter, supra note 10.
54
Rationalists share, at a minimum, a commitment to positivist social scientific research methods and the
assumption that states are rational, unitary actors pursuing exogenously given preferences in an anarchic (selfhelp) world. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, InternationalInstitutions: Two Approaches, 2 INT'L SruD. Q. 379
(1989); Ole Wmver, Figuresof InternationalThought: IntroducingPersons Instead of Paradigms, in THIE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: MASTERS IN THE MAKING 1, 19-21 (Iver B. Neumann & Ole Wwver eds., 1997)
[hereinafter FUTURE OF IR].
3 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 7; RONALD B. MrrcHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA:
ENVIRONMENTAL PoLicY AND TREATY COMPLANCE (1994); ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM (1993);Judith Goldstein, InternationalLaw and Domestic Institutions: ReconclingNorth American "Unfair" Trade Laws, 50 INT'L ORG. 541 (1996);
see also sources cited supra note 20.
' See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 20. Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane and Anne-Marie
Slaughter have convened a group of political scientists and international lawyers to study the phenomenon
of "legalization" of international regimes. Harold Koh is editing a volume of essays by international relations
scholars and international lawyers that includes contrasting approaches to international human rights. Finally,
Michael Byers organized the 1998 annual meeting of the British branch of the International Law Association
around the theme of international law and politics, explicitly featuring papers from both disciplines on subjects
ranging from the sources of international law to the regulation of the international economy. These papers
will also be published as an interdisciplinary edited volume.
" See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 8; YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GovERNANcE, supra note 24. But see Oran Young,
Remarks, 86 ASIL PROc. 172, 173-75 (1992) (pointing out the obstacles to interdisciplinary research).
3s See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOcIETY (1977); Andrew Hurrell, InternationalSociety and the Study
of Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORYAND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49 (Volker Rittberger &
Peter Mayer eds., 1993) (discussing the English school's relation to international law and regime theory);
Alexander Wendt & Raymond Duvall, Institutionsand InternationalOrder,in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL
CHALLENGES 51 (Ernst-Otto Czempiel &James S. Rosenau eds., 1989) (discussing the relation between Constructivism and the English school).
" Many international organizations specialists are among the relatively small group of IR scholars who "are
fluent in both languages" of law and IR, as Oran Young puts it. Young, supra note 37.
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Third, the rise of Constructivism over the past decade has challenged the rationalist
account of norms. Constructivists insist that actors' identities and interests are not exogenously given but are constituted through interaction on the basis of shared norms such
as international law, sovereignty and anarchy.40 Some constructivists have been studying
legal institutions and practices for years;41 others are following suit.42
Finally, liberal IR theory has reclaimed lost ground, reemerging not as W'ilsonian
idealism but as a positivist paradigm based on the centrality of state-society relations. 3
Liberals distinguish among states on the basis of domestic regime type, creating the
possibility of differential analyses of the creation of and compliance with international
law. Key factors include the role of domestic rule-of-law norms, separation of powers
and strong domestic courts. Liberal IR theorists are also exploring the likelihood of
sustained cooperation among liberal democracies and the potential for more equal
relations between small states and big states within alliances and other institutions limited
to liberal democracies.' The next wave of liberal IR scholarship is likely to decouple
liberalism from democracy, attempting to separate the effects of checks on government
power, including a strong and independent judiciary, from the effects of representative
government.45 The results will directly implicate the importance of domestic legal structures and the relationship between domestic and international law.
Thus, the new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship reflects both perceived
changes in world politics and diverse intradisciplinary dynamics. We now examine how
international legal scholars are drawing on IR theory in this latest round of interdisciplinary work.
II. How INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS ARE USING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

The recent enthusiasm for IR theory is based partly, if not principally, on the claim
that an understanding of the sister discipline will enrich international lawyers' practical
and intellectual work, from doctrinal analysis and policy prescriptions to international
legal theory. The story here, however, is richer and more complex than one in which
traditionally positivist lawyers have become more interested in "theorizing" as opposed'
to "describing," "reporting" or "narrating." Instead, IL scholars have drawn on IR
theory in a variety of ways. This section identifies three such ways: (1) to diagnose
international policy problems and to formulate solutions to them; (2) to explain the
function and structure of particular international legal institutions; and (3) to examine
and reconceptualize particular institutions or international law generally. Two preliminary observations are necessary regarding these categories. First, we are less interested
"' See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make ofIt, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992); JOHN G. RUGGIE,
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POL=.

ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998).

41 See, e.g., KRATOCmHIL, supra note 11; Martha Finnemore, InternationalOrganizations as Teachers of Norms:

The United NationsEducational Sdentific and CulturalOrganization and Science Policy, 47 INT'L ORG. 565 (1993);
NICHoLAS; G. ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING: RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORYAND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989); Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 20.
42
See Christian Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of InternationalSociety and the Nature of Fundamental
Institutions, 51 INT'L ORG. 555 (1997); Albert S. Yee, The CausalEffects of Ideas on Policies, 50 INT'L ORG. 69
(1996); Audie Klotz, Norms ReconstitutingInterests,49 INT'L ORG. 451 (1995).
'See Moravcsik, supranote 15; Daniel Deudney, Binding Powers, Bound States: The Logica and Geopolitics
of Negarchy, paper presented at the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 28-Apr. 2,
1994); Mark W. Zacher & Richard A. Matthew, LiberalInternationalTheoy: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,
in CONTROvRsIEs IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 107 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., 1995); THOMAS
RISSE-KAPPEN, BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONs BACK IN: NoN-STATE AcTORs, DoMEsnc STRucruRs,

AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1995); THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRACIEs: THE
EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1995) [hereinafter RISSE-KAPPEN, COOPERATION].
4" See RISSE-KAPPEN, COOPERATION, supra note 43.
11See MICHAEL W. DouLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE (1997); Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of IlliberalDemocracy,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 22.
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in the particular paradigms or schools of IR theory lawyers are invoking than in how
they are making use of these tools and insights in their work. Second, the categories
overlap in certain respects, and some writers' work fits into more than one category. We
chose them for their heuristic value in isolating uses of IR theory.
As should be expected of any such venture, the interdisciplinary corpus reflects a
number of false starts and failed attempts. At its best, the new interdisciplinary work
deepens our understanding of the causes of, and potential legal responses to, international problems and sharpens our understanding of what particular institutional arrangements do. At its worst, it simply restates what has already been done, misinterprets the
core propositions of IR work, or identifies vague similarities between IL and IR. Therefore, in assessing the work that has been done, we highlight the benefits and the risks
of each of these approaches, both to illustrate the value of further interdisciplinary work
and to help future endeavors avoid potential pitfalls.
Using fl? Theory to Diagnoseand Resolve InternationalProblems
The first category of interdisciplinary work is essentially "problem driven." International lawyers draw on theories and concepts in IR theory to diagnose or reframe a
variety of international problems and to formulate policy solutions. They seek to specify
the nature and causes of particular international problems and to identily possible
institutional responses. Collective goods, free-rider incentives, market failures, and gametheoretic models such as the Prisoner's Dilemma typically provide the theoretical framework for diagnostic and prescriptive work of this kind, although some scholars have
reached beyond these economics-based tools to other models or metaphors in the IR
literature.
Trade and environmental problems have been a fertile source for work in this area.
Eyal Benvenisti, for example, diagnoses freshwater resource management as a collectiveaction problem, draws on the IR literature to specify principles for overcoming collectiveaction problems, and then evaluates alternative procedural and substantive options for
regulating water resource management at the international level in light of these principles.46 Similarly, Robert Schmidt employs Robert Putnam's theory of two-level games to
a
explain the impasse in U.S.-Canadian Pacific salmon negotiations and to propose
47
unilateral strategy the United States might pursue to bring about agreement.
International legal scholars have also invoked IR theory to diagnose and resolve problems of ethnic conflict and international security. David Wippman, for example, draws
on Arend Lijphart's theory of consociationalism to examine potential legal solutions
to ethnic conflict and potential international legal objections to such arrangements.48
International legal scholars have also applied IR theory as a diagnostic and policy-prescriptive tool to the problems of Israeli-Palestinian relations, international terrorism, and
a range of other international issues from antitrust enforcement to trade wars. 49
supra note 4.
Robert J. Schmidt, InternationalNegotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the
Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission, 26 Nw. ENVrL. L. REv. 95 (1996); see also Miguel Montali-Mora,
InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Cheek to Cheek: An InternationalLaw/InternationalRelationsPerspective
on the US./ECAgriculturalExport Subsidies Dispute, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1 (1993) (seeling to use IR
theory to explain the source of the U.S.-European Community agricultural export subsidies dispute during
the Uruguay Round).
' See David Wippman, Practicaland Legal Constraintson InternalPower Sharing; in INTERNATIONAL Lw AND
CoNFrcr 211 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
ETHmc
49
See generalyJonathan R. Macey, Chicken Wars as a Prisoner'sDilemma: What's in a Game? 64 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 447 (1989); Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of InternationalEconomic
Cooperationand the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CAmozo L. REv. 925 (1996); Ayaz R. Shaikh, Note, A Theoretic
Approach to TransnationalTerrorism,80 GEo. LJ. 2131 (1992); Moshe Hirsch, TheFutureNegotiationsoverJerusalem,
StrategicalFactorsand Game Theory, 45 CATH. U. L. Ruv. 699 (1996); William B. T. Mock, Game Thioy, Signaling,
4 Benvenisti,
47
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This use of IR theory is valuable because it provides lawyers with powerful theoretical
and rhetorical tools to specify the nature and causes of substantive problems and the
types of regulatory regimes appropriate to deal with them. It is increasingly clear that
the characterization of the substantive problem has important implications for the appropriate form of regulatory response.50 All interdisciplinary IR/IL work is based, explicitly
or implicitly, on some model or diagnosis of the "world out there." By making these
conceptual frameworks more explicit, scholarship in this first category makes it possible
both to uncover commonalities among substantive problems that point the way to new
or different solutions and to examine the underlying conceptual frameworks themselves.
This type of interdisciplinary project, however, is not without drawbacks. At the most
basic level is a danger of borrowing models and metaphors from IR theory indiscriminately, particularly those-like the Prisoner's Dilemma-that evoke powerful images
and are accessible to newcomers to IR literature. As long as the limitations of these
models are appreciated, such borrowing can be a crucial source of innovation. However,
theory can itself become a game-leading to what Robert Keohane has described as
"model mania."'" Even the most elaborate models are no substitute for solid empirical
work, or, for lawyers, careful analysis of the operation of a particular law in economic,
social and political context.
A second drawback to this use of IR is a tendency to overlook the fact that the provision
of institutional responses to substantive policy problems may present the same sorts
of collective-action challenges as the substantive problems themselves. Institutions that
provide collective goods may be collective goods themselves, subject to the same difficulties of supply and maintenance as the underlying substantive benefits they are designed
to provide.52 This insight is a core contribution of the institutionalist research agenda:
by problematizing institutions, it has specified the conditions under which international
regimes are likely to emerge.
Using R Theory to Analyze ParticularInternationalLegal Institutions
If the first category of IR/IL scholarship uses IR theory mainly to generate theoretical
accounts of particular substantive problems, the thrust of the second category is to
"reason forward from a theoretical understanding of particular issue areas. . . to richer
explanations of the meaning and function of international agreements, procedures and
institutions." 3 Unlike work in the first category, work in this category is less concerned
with making policy recommendations or exploring solutions to particular policy problems; rather, it endeavors to catalogue and explain what particular international legal
institutions do and why they are structured as they are. Kenneth Abbott pioneered this
approach by examining, through the lens of rationalist regime theory, the functions
and InternationalLegal Relations, 26 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 33 (1992); Spencer W. Waller, Neo-Realism
and the InternationalHarmonization of Law: Lessonsfrom Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REv. 557 (1994).
7,,See, e.g., Hugh Ward, Game Theo2y and the Politics of the Global Commons, 37J. CONFLICT RESOL. 203 (1993)
(demonstrating that some global commons issues may be best analyzed as a Prisoner's Dilemma and others
as a game of Chicken, and showing that different institutional responses are appropriate to each); Duncan
Snidal, Coordinationvs. Prisoner'sDilemma: Implicationsfor InternationalCooperationand Regimes, 79 Am. POL. Sc.
REv. 923 (1985) (predicting that agreements designed to deal with prisoners' dilemmas will differ from those
designed to cope with coordination problems).
' Robert 0. Keohane, Studying Cooperation and Conflict: Intra-Rationalistic and Extra-Rationalistic Research Programs, talk at a roundtable on conflict and cooperation, American Political Science Association
annual meeting, San Francisco (Aug. 1996).
"Compare Benvenisti, supra note 4 (analyzing freshwater resources, but not the institutions that manage
them, as collective goods) with Abbott, supranote 1, at 379-81 (arguing that both collective goods themselves
and the legal regimes designed to provide them present collective-action dilemmas that can be analyzed in
terms of IR theory).
" Kenneth W. Abbott, "TrustBut Veify" The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other
InternationalAgreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1993).
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performed by international trade law54 and by the "assurance" and "verification" provisions of major arms control agreements.55
Others have followed suit. William Aceves explores the functions of particular
provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, explaining how the provisions are
consistent with the functions that institutionalists assert regimes perform.' Jamison
Colburn relies on regime theory to explain several features of the 1995 UN agreement
on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 5 7 David Fidler and Bruce Plotkin have
engaged in a lively debate over how far the new International Health Regulations
promulgated by the World Health Organization go toward performing the functions
that Institutionalism asserts an effective regime should perform. John Setear argues
that the theory of iterated play, as applied to international politics by institutionalist
scholars, offers the best explanation of the functions that the law of treaties performs,
and the best explanation why the law of treaties is structured as it is." In a subsequent
article, Setear examines whether the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility
are consistent with rationalist institutionalist predictions. 6' And, more recently,
Snidal to explore the functions
Abbott has teamed up with political scientist Duncan
61
organizations.
international
formal
by
performed
Legal scholars engaging IR in this way have reached beyond Institutionalism.
Richard Steinberg, for example, uses realist IR theory to explain why environmentfriendly rules are developing more quickly and thoroughly in the European Union
and the NAFTA than in the WTO.62 Following "realists like Stephen Krasner and
Geoffrey Garrett, who hold that powerful states set the rules of international regimes, ' 63 Steinberg argues that the varying scope and rate of development of tradeenvironment rules within these organizations are attributable to the relative differences in power between the richer, greener states and the poorer, browner states
among their members.
This use of IR is valuable to the extent that it sharpens our understanding of the
function of particular institutional arrangements. It represents an improvement over
descriptive projects that provide much information about how institutions are structured but fail to analyze the functions they perform. 64 A more precise understanding
of the functions performed by various treaty provisions and institutional features can
5 See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26
HARV. INTL LJ.501 (1985).
55
See Abbott, supra note 53.
56
William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and InternationalLegal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'v
227
57 (1997).
Jamison E. Colburn, Note, Turbot Wars: Straddling Stocks, Regime Theory, and a New U.N. Agrement, 6 FLA.
ST.U.J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 323 (1997).
5 David Fidler, Mission Impossible? InternationalLaw and Infectious Diseases, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 493
(1996); Bruce Plotkin, Mission Possible: The Future of the InternationalHealth Regulations, id. at 503.
59Setear, supra note 5.
6°John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and RationalistInternationalRelations Theory: The Rules ofRelease
and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1997). Setear
also argues that, to the extent there is a divergence between what IR theory predicts and the legal doctrines,
the doctrines should be modified to conform with the rationalist design hypothesis because rationalist Instituprovides a normative theory of how international arrangements should be organized. See id. at 8.
tionalism
6t
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 20.
'2 Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NATA, and WTO: Regional Trajedories of
Rule Development, 91 AJIL 231 (1997); see also Waller, supra note 49.
Steinberg, supra note 62, at 232.
6 In the now classic special issue of International Organizationon regime theory, Robert Keohane observed
that "[u]nderstanding the function of international regimes helps. . . to explain why actors have an incentive
to create them, and may therefore help to make behavior intelligible within a rational-choice mode of analysis
that emphasizes the role of incentives and constraints." Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International
Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141, 149 n.22 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
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help international lawyers and policy makers think
concretely about the requisite
65
elements of an effective international institution.
Moreover, as Abbott and Snidal point out, cataloguing the functions that institutions perform, while useful for these pragmatic reasons, may also help scholars tackle
more penetrating questions. For instance, under which conditions will institutions
perform functions well or poorly? The utility of a theory of what institutions do is
inevitably limited without a theory of when they can do it well. A second set of
questions focus on why particular international legal instruments take the form that
they do and, conversely, what difference form makes. Interdisciplinary research analyzing the functions that international legal instruments perform may well be a predicate for answering these questions, for "[u] ntil IR develops a better sense of the
range and importance of organizational functions, forms, and features, it cannot
produce compelling theoretical arguments about them. ' 66 Both sets of questions
present fruitful research projects for international legal scholars interested in the
functions particular legal institutions perform.
Using IR Theory to Reconceptualize InternationalLaw and Institutions
A third approach uses IR to critique and reconceptualize particular rules, institutions
or international law as a whole by exposing and tinkering with the assumptions on
which they are premised. Richard Shell, for example, employs IR theory to expose the
assumptions or normative visions that underlie the structure of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) so as to mount a critique of the WTO's organizational
structure.6 7 Shell argues that the structure of the WTO legal system and the content of
the WTO's adjudicatory decisions reflect rationalist institutionalist assumptions that
states are the primary actors in international politics and that states participate in the
GATT to circumvent inefficient domestic trade policies. He then attacks those assumptions on normative grounds, arguing for a new institutional structure that gives standing
to nonstate actors and sees its mission as not only promoting free trade, but also providing
a forum for a dialogue in the civic republican tradition about distributive justice and
procedural fairness among member nations.rs
David Bederman traces how ideas about the legal status of international organizations
developed in the legal academy and how a tension between "personality" and "community" came to define the character of international organizations.69 He argues that a
particular conception of international organizations as "persons" provided
the basis for
70
the emergence of epistemic communities and international regimes.
'A recent article by Frank Garcia illustrates what such work might look like. Frank J. Garcia, New Frontiers
in InternationalTrade: Dedsionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 18 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 357, 368-69 (1997) (drawing on Abbott & Snidal's work on meso-institutions to make proposals
concerning the governance structure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas).
""Kenneth IV. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Mesoinstitutions, paper presented at Seminar on International Law
and7 International Relations, Harvard Law School (1995).
' G. Richard Shell, TradeLegalism andInternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,
44 DuKE LJ. 829 (1995).
'" This-and a second article by Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participationby Nonstate Partiesin the
Vorld Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L Econ. L. 359 (1996)-prompted a lively exchange with Philip
Nichols over which school of IR theory supplies the best assumptions for the construction of the WTO. See
Philip Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization, id. at 851.
'" DavidJ. Bederman, The Souls of InternationalOrganizations:Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Sparte4
36 VA.J. LNTL L. 275, 371, 376 (1996).
"An epistemic community is a set of experts, often located in multiple states, sharing a common core of
xalues and beliefs, a specialized language or practice, and a common policy enterprise. The epistemic communities literature suggests that, by virtue of their expert knowledge in policy-relevant areas, such groups can
influence the success or failure of international cooperation. See generally Knowledge, Power, and International
Policy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1 (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992) (special issue).
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Slaughter seeks to use IR theory to reconceptualize the basic definition of international
law. She argues that the basic assumptions of liberal IR theory-that individuals and
groups operating in domestic and transnational society are the primary actors in international relations, that they are represented in some manner by governments, and that
intergovernmental relations privilege what states want (preferences) more than what they
can get (power) -point to a much broader definition of international law.71 Benedict
Kingsbury draws on liberal IR theory to understand and untangle patterns of behavior
in international trade and environmental issues. He explores and compares traditional
state-based conceptions of international law
with a vision of international law as the law
72
of an emerging transnational civil society.
Both Slaughter and Kingsbury also look to IR theory to help develop different conceptions of the state. Slaughter uses the liberal emphasis on state-society relations to highlight the need for a disaggregated model of the state, replacing the fiction of a unitary
actor with a conception of distinct governmental institutions acting quasi-autonomously
in the international system.7' Kingsbury juxtaposes the traditional model of the state as
principal, dominant in both IR and IL, with a liberal model of the state as agent,
responding to individuals and groups in domestic and transnational society. 74 He assesses
the advantages and disadvantages of the two conceptions in terms of the likely doctrinal
impact both on specific groups, such as indigenous peoples, and on the long-term
proposals for stability and society in the international system.
At its best, this type of scholarship can be powerful and exciting, opening up new
vistas and challenging international lawyers to rethink fundamental assumptions of their
discipline. However, it can also be highly abstract, requiring scholars working in this
idiom to make a special effort to relate their theoretical insights to more concrete
problems addressed by scholars working in specific subject areas.
Ill. BRINGING LAW TO BEAR (AGAIN) ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

To this point, we have canvassed interdisciplinary work that examines international
law and institutions through the lens of IR theory but does not necessarily engage IR
theory in a dialogue about the nature and conditions of international life. In this section,
we turn to interdisciplinary work in which international lawyers attempt consciously to
challenge, supplement or develop the ideas and techniques of IR theory on questions
of common concern to both disciplines.
International lawyers have had a range of reactions to the recent surge of interest in
IR theory. Some have responded, "We thought of it first."7' Other legal scholars object
71See Slaughter, supra note 10. Slaughter also uses IR theory to evaluate the efficacy and suitability of the
law of extraterritoriality and recommends specific doctrinal changes grounded in a liberal theory of IR. See
Anne-Marie Slaughter, LiberalInternationalRelations Theoy and InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 717 (1995). She conducts a similar analysis of the United Nations. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal
Agenda forPeace: InternationalRelations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 377 (1995).
72Kingsbury, supranote 23.
7
See Slaughter, supra note 10; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order,FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct.
1997, at 183.
74
Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereign or Agent? Globalization, Democratization, and the Place of the State in
International Law (Feb. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
75 See, e.g., LYNNE M. JURGIELEWICZ, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRoSPEcTs
FOR PROGRESS INTHE LEGAL ORDER 116-17 n.6 (1996) (claiming that legal scholar L. F. E. Goldic "introduced
the concept of regimes into international law over a decade before it was introduced into the international
relations literature by Ernst Haas"). Without wishing to contribute further to this debate, we should also note
that many people creditJohn Ruggie with originating the concept of international regimes. SeeJohn G. Ruggic,
InternationalResponses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT'L ORG. 557, 569 (1975).
The more interesting general point is that lawyers are rediscovering their own concept of regimes, which
differs from that used by political scientists, as Shinya Murase points out. Shinya Murase, Ferspectivesfom
InternationalEconomic Law on TransnationalEnvironmentalIssues, 253 RECUEIL DES CouRs 283, 413-14 (1995)
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to interdisciplinary collaboration with IR on the ground that IR and IL share complicity
in creating and upholding a corrupt and demoralizing social system, 76 or that they share
unacknowledged assumptions or political commitments. 7 7 Still others have welcomed
the interest in IR theory while reasserting the value of ideas, projects and techniques
developed and practiced in IL. Michael Byers recently declared, for example, that "international relations scholars need to be told that international law is different from the
78
other factors they study."
Byers's reaction, welcoming interdisciplinary work but reasserting the distinctiveness
of law and legal institutions in international affairs, is shared by many international
lawyers. While some early interdisciplinary accounts treated IR as the source of theory
and method and IL primarily as the source of empirical raw materials (in the form of
detailed histories, anecdotes and thick description), IL has gone far beyond being a
mere repository of empirical work for interdisciplinary projects. Some interdisciplinary
work reverses this division of labor altogether. Lori Damrosch's work on constitutional
control over war powers, for example, takes an empirical proposition from IR,namely,
that democracies do not go to war with each other, and seeks to explain it in terms of
variation in the structures of domestic legal institutions.7 9
This section explores three ways that international lawyers are "bringing law to bear"8 °
on interdisciplinary scholarship: by asserting the causal impact of legal rules, institutions
and processes on actors and actions; by examining the role of law in the construction
of actors and social structures; and by emphasizing the importance of law made by
domestic or transnational actors in explaining international phenomena. None of these
approaches denies the importance of power and self-interest in international politics,
but each nevertheless claims a distinctive and substantial role for law.
Legal Process as a Causal Mechanism
A number of international legal scholars have responded to the recent surge of interest
in IR theory by arguing that the process by which international law is created, interpreted
and applied has a distinctive effect on international behavior that is not fully captured
by regime theory. These lawyers believe that law has a causal impact on international
affairs through a process of communication on the basis of norms. This idea of legal
process has had a broad and lasting influence in the international legal academy, especially in the United States, and has been used in several forms to respond to the current
wave of interest in IR theory.
First, some scholars have drawn on the New Haven School's analysis of international law
as a process of authoritative decision making designed to achieve particular normative goals
(asserting that regimes are formed on a foundation of a treaty or treaties concluded between states or international organizations; that their objective is to realize either the shared interests of the states concerned or the
general interests of the international community as a whole; that member states are required to fulfill nonreciprocal obligations toward the regime; and that regimes have self-contained procedures to settle claims and
disputes among members). It is a more precise definition than the now-classic formulation used in Krasner's
original volume on "international regimes," see Stephen D. Krasner, StructuralCauses and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIoNAL REGIMES, supranote 64, at 1, 2, and it may be useful to both
disciplines.
- See, e.g., PHmup ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NExv WORLD at xvii (1990); Philip Allott, Kant or
Won't: Theory and Moral Responsibility (The BSIA Lecture, December 1995), 23 Rav. INTL STUD. 339 (1997).
7 See, e.g., Outi Korhonen, Liberalism and InternationalLaw: A Centre Projectinga Periphey, 65 NORDIcJ. INT'L
L. 481 (1996) (arguing, among other things, that international law and liberal IR theory share a basic liberal
tradition and conceptual framework).
7"Byers, supra note 5, at 205.
7'Lori F. Damrosch, ConstitutionalControl over WarPowers:A Common Core ofAccountability in Democratic
Societies,
50 U. MInMi L. REv.181 (1995).
""See Roger Fisher, BringingLaw to Bearon Governments, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1130 (1961); Nicholas G. Onuf &
James L.Taulbee, BringingLaw to Bearon InternationalRelations Theory Courses, PS (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Wash.,
D.C.), June 1993, at 249.
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of human dignity and world order. For example, Lynne Jurgielewicz finds regime theory
useful, but inadequate on its own, to analyze international environmental law. She supplements regime theory with the New Haven School's policy-oriented approach, in order to
reflect the "decision-making process in which law making occurs." 81 She attempts to synthesize regime theory and policy-oriented legal process so as to highlight the role of "normative
expectations" and the process by which enhanced knowledge and shared expectations
gradually translate into a concrete set of legal rules. 8 2 Whether the New Haven School's
approach presents a genuine alternative to power- or interest-based IR approaches, however,
has long been debated by international lawyers and political scientists8 3
The other major "process" approach to international law is the "international legal
process" school, which continues to resonate strongly in the U.S. international law
academy.84 Its central claim is that the process of creating, interpreting and applying
international law, while rarely outcome determinative, constrains state behavior by forming the basis on which actions must be justified, allocating decision-making authority,
and determining the institutional structures within which political decisions are reached.
It emphasizes the distinctiveness of law and legal reasoning as forms of social control.
In recent years, Abram and Antonia Chayes have used this approach as a starting point
to engage IR theory on the question of why states comply with treaty rules.85 They
agree with institutionalist IR theorists that treaties perform functions such as signaling,
coordination, monitoring and enforcement; but they assert that IR theory fails to appreciate the unique role that legal process plays in the performance of these functions.
In their view, the most important influence on governments' compliance choices is
engagement in the ongoing discursive practices of explanation, justification and persuasion in which states necessarily engage as members of the network of interdependent,
86
overlapping regulatory regimes that characterizes current international affairs.

Byers, in his response to Setear, argues that the impact of a legal rule derives not
merely from its having been "iterated" but from "the fact that it is the result of rule
creating processes within a legal system." 87 Unlike other factors studied by political
scientists, legal rules "are not generally subject to change solely in response to fluctuations in the immediate interests of states. ' '88 Customary rule-creating processes, Byers
argues, give rules a legal specificity that enables them to shape future behavior through
a sense of obligation, thus constraining and modifying state power. 89
81

supra note 75, at 244.
Id. at 111 (quoting L. F. E. Goldie, Special Regimes and PreemptiveActivities in InternationalLaw, 11 INT'L &

52JURGIELuvIcZ,

Comp.L.Q. 670 (1962)).
' See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of InternationalLaw and the Theory ofInternationalRelations, 57 ASIL

PRoc. 26 (1963).
' See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYEs, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
(1968); ABRAM CHAws, THE CUBAN MIssILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISEs AND THE ROLE OF LAw (1974). For

a recent comparison of the New Haven School and the international legal process approach, ,;ee
Koh, Why
Obe? supra note 11, at 2618-19.
QCiAEs & CHAvxs, supranote 6; see also Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, On Compliance,47 INT'L ORG.

175 (1993); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in InternationalRegulatory
Regimes, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 280 (Jessica T.
Mathews ed., 1991).
8 See CHAYES & CHAYEs, supranote 6, at 118-23. This discursive process has several distinctive characteristics:
it is carried out on the basis of legal norms; actors must attempt to gain assent to their value judgments on
reasoned rather than idiosyncratic grounds; and normative factors such as legitimacy (of both the process and

the substance of rule making) play a large role injustification and persuasion. The model draws substantially on
Thomas Franck's analysis of the roles of legitimacy and fairness in international law. See FRANca, supra note

27; FRANCK, supra note 32.
' Byers, supra note 5, at 203.
88 Id. at 204.
' Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary InternationalLaw from an Interdisciplinary
Perspective,17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109 (1995).
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A final example of work in this vein is Koh's effort to develop a causal, predictive
account of why actors obey international law.90 His model of "transnational legal process ' departs from previous international legal process approaches by focusing on
transnationalprocesses of interaction involving not just states, but governmental and
nongovernmental actors and domestic and international legal institutions. He argues,
contrary to both rationalist regime theory and what he considers to be Louis Henkin's
utilitarian approach,92 that compliance with international rules is not explained entirely
by the functional benefits it provides but, rather, by the process of internalization of
international legal norms into the internal value sets of domestic legal systems. This
internalization occurs through a complex process of repeated interaction, norm enunciation and interpretation, which occurs in such varied contexts as transnational public
law litigation in domestic courts, international commercial arbitration, and lobbying of
legislatures by nongovernmental organizations."
Law and the Social Constructionof the InternationalSystem
Rationalist regime theory assumes actors with fixed or exogenously given interests and
focuses on the "instrumental" question of how international institutions and power
relations affect the pursuit of these fixed interests. As a result, it tends to confine law to a
"normative optic." Keohane offers a synthesis of these "instrumental" and "normative"
modes of analysis that would give law a distinctive role, in the form of persuasion on
the basis of shared norms, but this synthesis still assumes that states pursue fixed interests.94 Many legal scholars propose a fundamentally different account of the role of law
in international relations, contending that the processes of persuasion and justification
on the basis of norms play a constitutive role in the formation of actors' identities and
interests and in the structure of the international system itself. On a deeper level, this
approach rejects a simple law/power dichotomy, arguing instead that legal rules and
norms operate by changing interests and thus reshaping the purposes for which power
is exercised. 95
Chayes and Chayes suggest that participation in international legal process can contribute to transformation of states' identities and interests in the direction of treaty norms.96
Koh makes this idea a central feature of his model. For him, the process of interaction
and internalization is constitutive: each instance of interaction and norm interpretation
"generates a legal rule which will guide future transnational interactions between the
parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and eventually, repeated
participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests and even the identities
of the participants in the process," so that they perceive compliance to be in their
self-interest. 97 Similarly, Abbott, in an article that draws on ideational explanations to
supplement a rational choice framework, argues that shared ideas about markets, politics
and state-society relations influence economic and political structures such as states,
markets and international regimes; that these structures owe their existence to such
constitutive ideas; and that they change as these ideas change. 98
"' See Koh, Wiy Obey? supra note 11, at 2600.
,ASee id.; see also Koh, TransnationalProcess, supra note 11.
HENKIN, supra note 26.
Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2646.
'4 Keohane, supra note 8.
Cf Hurrell, supra note 38, at 53 (arguing that the central challenge facing both international law and
regime theory is to show that law and norms exert behavioral constraints on actors at least partially independently of power or interest).
CHArts
s
& CHAizs, supra note 6, at 27.
17 Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2646 (drawing in part on constructivist IR theory).
' Kenneth W. Abbott, 'Economic" Issues and Political Participation:The Evolving Boundaries of International
Federalism, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 971 (1996) (citing John G. Ruggie, InternationalRegimes, Transactions, and
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Martti Koskenniemi challenges the law/power dichotomy by claiming that realist approaches to collective security fail "to see to what extent their determining concepts
such as 'interest,' 'power,' or 'security' are themselves defined and operative within a
normative context" of international legal discourse.99 Recounting his experience as a
member of the Finnish delegation to the Security Council during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis,
Koskenniemi argues that normative discourse among members of an international community constitutes and transforms the members' identities and self-interests and the
meaning of "security" and "aggression," and makes possible and meaningful the organization and application of physical power, in a manner not grasped by causal-descriptive
100
IR theory.
Finally, Shirley Scott suggests a different way to challenge rationalist IR's law/power
dichotomy. Whereas "legal process" scholars such as Chayes and Chayes and Koh challenge the dichotomy (in part) by characterizing "legitimacy" as a type or source of
power,' 01 Scott challenges it by analyzing international law as an ideology, and ideology
as power.102 She argues that demonstrated acceptance of the ideology of international
law is a sine qua non of membership in the international system, and that this ideology
upholds the power structure of the system by presenting itself in a way that blocks
the
03
evidence of the power structure and of its own relationship to that structure.
Domestic and TransnationalLaw as Explanatory Variables
A third way that international lawyers are making a substantive contribution to the IR
literature is by emphasizing the importance of domestic and transnational law. Transnational law, as originally conceived by Philip Jessup, 10 4 swept all domestic law bearing on
international relations and law regulating relations between governments and foreign
nationals into international law's embrace. The Restatements of American foreign relations
law have been animated by a similar spirit 0 5 And the study of international law in
domestic courts is a perennial favorite among international lawyers.
Liberal IR theory casts much of this work in a new light by emphasizing the relationship
between domestic politics and international behavior. In particular, the large, and still
growing, literature on the democratic peace probes the correlation between liberal
democratic government and a state's propensity to go to war.'0 6 As noted above, Lori
Damrosch takes that correlation at face value and explores the link between the democratic peace and constitutional provisions governing the division of war powers between
the executive and the legislature. 0 7 Thomas Franck demonstrates the link, "in normative
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the PostwarEconomic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 195 (1982), and Alexander Wendt,
Collective Identity Formation and the InternationalState, 88 Am.POL. SCI. REv. 384 (1994)).
' Martti Koskenniemi, The PlaceofLaw in Collective Security, 17 MICH.J. INT'L L. 455, 464 (1996) [hereinafter
Koskenniemi, Place of Law]; see also Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of InternationalLaw, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L 4
(1990).
' 0oKoskenniemi, Place of Law, supra note 99, at 467-78.
1 See supranote 86. On the other hand, Koh criticizes Franck's approach for its failure to account for the
process
by which norms are internalized by domestic legal systems. Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2633.
02
1 ShirleyV. Scott, InternationalLawasldeologj:Theorizing theRelationBetween InternationalLawand International
Politics, 5 Eut. J. INT'L L. 313 (1994).
103
id.
104 PHILIP C. JEssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
...
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
106See, e.g., PATHS TO PEACE: Is DEMOCRACY THE ANsWER? (Miriam F. Elman ed., 1997); DEBATING THE
DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1996); BRUCE RuSSTrT,
GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993); Michael W. Doyle,
Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL.Sci. REv. 1151 (1986); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
ForeignAffairs, Part 1, 12 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 205 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs,
Part 2, id. at 323.
07
' See Damrosch, supra note 79.
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text and practice," between "compliance with the norms prohibiting war making" and
"observance of human rights and the democratic entitlement." 10 8 And Brad Roth challenges the thin definition of democracy used by many IR theorists. 0 9 Many other lawyers
are turning their attention to the entire gamut of relationships between democracy and
international law."'
More generally, Slaughter argues that liberal IR theory provides a coherent analytical
framework for sorting out the jumble of different types of law and legal actors currently
encompassed by transnational law."' She focuses on bodies of rules and norms that
have largely been ignored by political scientists and international lawyers alike. Liberal
IR theory privileges individuals and groups in their relations with one another and with
the state, in either its unitary or its disaggregated form. n 2 Liberal IR theorists should thus
expand their study of rules and regimes to include domestic law regulating individualindividual and individual-state relations, the heart of transnational law. In addition,
however, both IR and IL scholars should pay more attention to voluntary codes of
conduct adopted by corporate and other private actors, as well as emerging bodies of
transgovernmental law, such as the rules and principles adopted by securities regulators,
central bankers, environmental officials and others operating transgovernmentally to
guide their domestic activities.
Finally, Slaughter's emphasis on the disaggregated state and Koh's model of transnational legal process highlight national courts, government agencies and legislators as
international or transgovernmental actors in their own right. To the extent that these
institutions are constrained by domestic law, domestic legal rules emerge as a constraint
on state action in the international system. This "bottom up" approach complements
the traditional focus on domestic implementation of international rules and confronts
political scientists and international lawyers alike with new worlds to conquer, or at least
to analyze.
To summarize, international lawyers are exploring the causal impact of international
legal process on state behavior, examining the constitutive role of normative discourse
in international affairs, and asserting the explanatory relevance of domestic, transnational and transgovernmental actors, laws and institutions. In each of these areas, they
are reasserting the distinctive role of law and norms in explanations of international
affairs and inviting IR theorists to join in a dialogue on questions of common concern
to both disciplines.
IV. THE IR/IL NEXUS: A PROPOSED CoLLABoRATIvE

RESEARCH AGENDA

The purpose of this article is not only to track the interdisciplinary trajectory thus far,
but also to explore how IR and IL scholars might collaborate most profitably in the
future. We begin by mapping three integrated subfields of what might be thought of as a
"joint discipline."" 3 The purpose of this mapping exercise is less to draw new disciplinary
"",
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 46, 89 (1992); see also Gregory
H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw, 17 YALE INT'L L.J. 539 (1992); Gregory H. Fox &
Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1995).
"'"
Brad R. Roth, EvaluatingDemocraticProgress:A Normative TheoreticalApproach, 9 ETHics & INT'L Arr. 55
(1995).
"' For a critical review of this literature, see Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflecting on Some International
Legal Theses, 8 EuR.J. INT'L L. 449 (1997).
Slaughter, supra note 10, at 504.
"2See Moravcsik, supra note 15.
"' In remarks in 1992, Kenneth Abbott introduced the concept of a "joint discipline," which he defined
as "the study of organized international cooperation." Kenneth W. Abbott, Elements of a joint Discipline,86
ASIL PRoc. 167 (1992) (remarks at panel entitled "International Law and International Relations Theory.
Building Bridges"). We borrow the term, but with a broader definition.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 92:367

boundaries than to offer an alternative to the straightforward projection of lR theoretical
paradigms onto IL. We delineate three areas of convergence between international
lawyers and international political scientists who share roughly the same deep assumptions about the international system and are interested in similar subjects. We then turn
to a catalogue of research questions that could structure a more collaborative intellectual
and practical agenda.
In undertaking both these tasks, we hope to open a debate more than to shape one.
Scholars from both disciplines are invited to challenge our categories and questions and
offer their own.
Mapping the JointDiscipline
The first subfield is best described by Abbott's label, "international governance theory. ' 114 It focuses on the organizational features, functions and purposes of the structures
and institutions that order international life and are situated "above" the level of the
state' 15 IL work that focuses on the function and structure of international law and
institutions fits squarely within this domain, as does more recent IR work that has taken
international law and formal international organizations as serious research subjects.
The methodology is usually rationalist, and most research in this vein brackets the role
of domestic politics and the constitutive dimensions of rules and interstate interaction.
The second subfield examines social construction through shared norms. It focuses
on the impact of norms and norm-based discourses on actors and social structures in
the international system. Many IR constructivists and critical scholars in both disciplines
are exploring, in varying ways, the same basic proposition: that actors, identities, interests
and social structures are culturally and historically contingent products of interaction
on the basis of shared norms. In addition, recent IL work (particularly by Chayes and
Chayes and Koh) on the transformation of interests and behavior through discursive
processes of argument, persuasion and internalization draws on and responds to constructivist IR scholarship.
The third subfield falls under the general label of liberal agency theory. Scholars
working in this vein focus on the nexus between international and domestic law and
politics. Many IR scholars are turning to comparative politics to help map patterns of
state behavior, rejecting the possibility of positing consistent preferences for states qua
states." 6 International law has moved in five short years from a discipline in which
distinguishing between states in terms of domestic regime type was virtually taboo to
sufficient acceptance and incorporation of democratic peace theory to invite attacks on
"liberal millenarianism."117 The fundamental assumption orienting this work is that the
concept of a domain of unitary and functionally identical rational state actors interacting
"above" the level of the state is deeply artificial and ultimately counterproductive. Interstate relations should instead be studied as a function of state-society relations, relations
that are structured very differently across different societies and cultures but that involve
18
the state as an agent of social actors.
These subfields representjust one way of mapping the interdisciplinary field, one that
overlaps, but also goes beyond, the basic IR paradigms of Institutionalism, Constructivism
14 Kenneth W. Abbott, Remarks on "Rationalistic Theory," paper presented at conference on international
law and international relations, Yale Law School, at 1 (Feb. 22-24, 1996).

"

5

Id. at 4.

16 SeeAndrew Moravcsik, From the OutsideIn: InternationalRelations and the "Obsolescence" of Comp(,zrativePolitics,
APSA-CP (newsletter of the American Political Science Association section on comparative politics), Summer
1996,
at 9.
7
"
See Marks, supra note 110.
18
See Kingsbury, supra note 74.
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and Liberalism. By focusing on substantive themes animating different categories of
interdisciplinary scholarship, we hope to move toward a much more specific research
agenda. We therefore introduce six research questions, or sets of questions, that IR and
IL scholars working from a variety of methodological, epistemological and ontological
premises might profitably explore together.
This strategy helps avoid two potential pitfalls in interdisciplinary work. First, laying
out substantive questions for joint research underscores the necessity of moving beyond
intellectual history and mapping exercises. Second, the research question format emphasizes that interdisciplinarity is not an end in itself. As Kratochwil warns, unless great care
is taken, "the distinctive contributions various 'disciplines' make to our understanding
get lost, and behind the phrases of 'integration' and bridge-building stands possibly an
impoverished rather than an original and fecund new research agenda." 11 9 The task is
which a variety of approaches and methodological
to identify key substantive puzzles ' "to
20
orientations can then contribute. '
A CollaborativeResearch Agenda
1. Regime Design: What are the specific designfeaturesthat best addressand respond to particular
types of internationalproblems?
International lawyers have long assumed that the design of an international institution
can affect how well it fulfills its goals. Recent empirical work in IR has begun to demonstrate this proposition by showing that structural variations can affect compliance rates
with international treaties.' 2' This work opens up a relatively unexplored research vein:
the identification of the specific design features that best address particular types of
international problems.
Interdisciplinary collaboration can enhance the contribution that each discipline
might independently make to this research. As noted in part II, a great deal of prescriptive
IL scholarship does not specify assumptions about how states behave or why international
agreements might break down. Yet effective regime design requires a theory of why states
cooperate through institutional arrangements and why those arrangements might not
succeed. IR theory suggests some important variables-the distribution of power among
member nations, the roles of interested substate and nonstate groups, the potential for
opportunism-which themselves imply design options that may improve an institution's
effectiveness (e.g., adding or subtracting member states, granting standing in international organizations to particular domestic or transnational interest groups, and creating
incentives to deter cheating).
Conversely, although IR theory predicts when institutionalized cooperation might
occur and specifies the functions that institutions perform, its prescriptive implications
tend to be abstract. Advice such as "improve monitoring" and "facilitatz information
exchange" is pitched at too high a level of generality to be useful to international lawyers
or other regime architects. Detailed knowledge of law and legal institutions permits the
IR scholar to go beyond midlevel generalizations to specify a distinctive set of design
options and possibilities. This is in part the animus behind the recent work by Abbott
and Snidal on the functions performed by different types of formal international organi122
zations.
"Friedrich

Kratochwil, Constructivism as an Approach to International Law and International Relations,

paper presented at conference on international law and international relations theory, Yale Law School, at 2
(Oct. 1997).
12 Id. at 4.
121 See

2

Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters, 48 INT'L ORG. 425 (1994).

" See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 20.
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The ultimate goal of this research would be to specify the institutional design options
that best address particular types of international problems.' 23 It is difficult to predict
the path such research might take. Game-theoretical work might analogize international
policy problems to particular configurations of information and incentives--the Prisoner's Dilemma, for example-and translate the general prescriptions of the gametheory literature into concrete proposals grounded in specific institutional features.
Alternatively, scholars interested in the links between compliance and domestic politics
might begin to code international problems according to the configuration of a specified
domestic factor postulated to bear on the efficacy of any given policy solution.
This research question does not presuppose a commitment to a particular set of
assumptions about the international world or to any particular epistemological or ontological orientation. Realists might explore how best to assure that international institutions remain effective instruments through which powerful states maintain the balance
of power. Institutionalists might focus on mechanisms that reduce the opportunity for
cheating, such as monitoring, the use of hostages and bonds, and the other methods of
making credible commitments to support exchange that are explored in the literature
on law and economics, industrial organization, and transaction-cost economics. Liberals
might focus on design features that enhance and shape the links between the institution
and domestic institutions and interest groups. Constructivists might seek to identify the
design features that facilitate the type of interstate interaction most likely to positively
transform identities and interests around a preferred international norm. In each approach, the substantive puzzle at the heart of the inquiry remains the same.
In exploring this research vein, IR and IL scholars might both profitably examine
the analogy of international regime design to the creation of "deals" or cooperative
commercial enterprises undertaken by competitive business firms in domestic arenas.
Analogizing states to firms is not uncommon and is at least superficially compelling
because both can be modeled as self-interested, boundedly rational actors operating in
a milieu where distributional issues (profits and security) matter.'24 Interfirm bargaining-a topic that one scholar asserts should be the subject of a "whole new research
program"'1-has received considerable attention from corporate law scholars and specialists in law and economics. These scholars have developed a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between deal structure and compliance incentives. Ronald Gilson,
for example, has developed what is in effect a functional theory of merger agreements;
in terms that echo Keohane, his work explains how the basic provisions contained in
standard merger and acquisition agreements provide a solution to various forms of
market failure. 26 A close analysis of various business deals-and the scholarship of
those who study them-might provide insights for a theory of international institutional
27
design.
" As Keohane recently observed, "the most fundamental question scholars wish to answer concerns effectiveness: What structures, processes, and practices make international institutions more or less capable of affecting
policies-and outcomes-in desired ways?" Robert 0. Keohane, InternationalInstitutions: Can Interdependence
Work? FOREIGN POV', Spring 1998, at 82, 89.
" 4 Several international relations scholars have analogized the international system to a market. The most
prominent of these market analogies treats states as oligopolistic firms, and posits several similaribes between
the two, including that both firms and states act strategically; both may be conceptualized as rational egoists;
elimination is possible; and both may "exit" from cooperative ventures. See KEOHANE, supra note 3, at 89;
Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of InternationalPolitics, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 31 (Kenneth A.
Oye ed., 1986).
"nSee Susan Strange, States, Firns, and Diplomacy, in INTERNATIONAL PoLITrcAL ECONOMr. PERSECTIVES ON
GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 61 (Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 3d ed. 1995).
126RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Picing 94 YALE LJ. 239 (1984).
" Charles ipson points out that the analogy between states and firms is not perfect, since, unlike states,
firms bargain in a milieu where legal promises can be enforced by a third party. See Lipson, supra note 20, at
503-04. The analogy may still be fruitful, however, because "deals" remain durable not only, and sometimes
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2. Process Design: How should governments structure the process by which new international
legal instruments and institutions are negotiated?
Many IR models of bargaining use outcome as their dependent variable. Independent
variables are typically asymmetries in "power" or specified resources and capabilities.
In recent years, a robust interdisciplinary scholarship on bargaining has called the utility
of these types of models into question. 128 The insight of this research is that outcomes
cannot be explained solely by the preferences and payoffs of the players; they are dependent in part on the process by which bargainers seek to resolve conflict or achieve consensus. At least in bargains characterized by incomplete information and boundedly rational
actors, some mutually beneficial agreements will not be achieved simply because the
negotiation process is structured poorly, not because there is no zone of possible agreement. Therefore, for IR and IL scholars who believe that institutions "matter," the
process by which states negotiate new international legal instruments should be of crucial
interest.
An inquiry into "process design" would seek to specify the optimal process strategies
for facilitating consensus in international multilateral negotiations. Relevant questions
include: How should stakeholders be determined? What is the most appropriate role
for interested substate and transnational actors? Should the goal be to negotiate an
agreement between a few key countries or an agreement with universal participation?
Should decision making occur by consensus, majority vote or some other principle?
Who should control the agenda, and how? How should information be produced and
exchanged? What conditions might produce a shift in the cognitive frames of the bargainers, so that they see the payoffs not as zero-sum but as offering mutual gains? What is
the best procedure for making sensitive distributional choices? How might procedure
ease "behind the table" constraints on the bargaining agents? What are 1the
respective
29
roles of formal negotiation processes and parallel informal negotiations?
Insights from game theory, institutional economics, decision theory, prospect theory,
social psychology and negotiation analysis can inform this inquiry,130 building on work
in IR on multiparty negotiations, coalitions, holdout problems, internal-external negotiations and two-level games. Like research on regime design, this research vein can be
explored through rationalist,13' liberal 132 and constructivist 3 lenses. Insights will be
particularly timely, given the increasing trend toward legalized international cooperation.
not even primarily, because the parties have made legally binding promises to one another, but because their
agreements build in "incentive structures" that make compliance compatible with each side's self-interest. See
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPEr & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, THE LAWYERAs NEGOTIATOR (forthcoming).
' SeeJames K. Sebenius, Challenging ConventionalExplanationsof InternationalCooperation:NegotiationAnalysis
and the Case of Epistemic Communities, 46 INT'L ORG. 323, 330 (1992) (discussing the limitations of standard
two-by-two bargaining models that juxtapose cooperation and defection).
, Sebenius has highlighted the importance of these questions. James K. Sebenius, Designing Negotiations
Towarda New Regime, 15 INT'L SECURITY 110 (1991); see alsoStepan Wood, Renegades and Vigilantes in Multilateral
EnvironmentalRegimes: Lessons of the Canada-EU'Turbot War," in INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON MENTAL NEGOTIATION 184 (Lawrence E. Susskind et al. eds., 1998) (examining negotiation processes within existing
international environmental organizations).
"' For an overview of the interdisciplinary research on dispute resolution, see BARRIERs TO CoNar REsOLU-ION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
"' Several scholars have explored coalition dynamics in multiparty bargains characterized by incomplete or
asymmetric information. See generally HowARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); David
Lax &James K. Sebenius, Thinking CoalitionaUy:PartyArithmetic, Process Opportunism, and Strategic Sequencing in
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIs 153 (Peyton Young ed., 1991); James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With
Whom Should I Talk First? in WISE CHOicEs: DECISIONS, GA iEs, AND NEcGovATIoNs 324 (Richard J. Zeckhauser
et al. eds., 1996).
""2 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427
(1988); see also DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLONiACY INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITcs (Peter B.
Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993).
"' if one can specify the conditions in which intersubjective understandings of interstate relations are
positively transformed, it may be possible to structure the process by which states (or their agents) negotiate
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3. Discourse on the Basis of Shared Norms: How precisely are actors and social structures
mutually constituted by social practices? What is the role of power in the discursiveproduction of
identities and shared meanings? What counts as "'proof'in norm-based discourse?
One possibility suggested by the previous set of collaborative research questions is that
participation in international negotiation and bargaining may lead to the transformation
of actors' perceptions of their self-interest. This is reminiscent of the claim that actors
and social structures in the international system are constituted and transformed by
argument, reasoning and persuasion on the basis of shared norms.' The present set
of research questions is designed to focus on certain aspects of this claim that pose
particular challenges to both IL and IR scholars.
First, research should focus on developing a theory or theories of action appropriate for
norm-based discourse.'3 5 Legal scholarship and practice are likely to be good sources of
analysis and empirical material for this task. As Kratochwil says, "[S]ince lawyers have
been arguing with rules all their lives, their 'style' of argument as well as their methodolo36
In
gies deserve far greater attention than they have received from social scientists.'
lanand
of
speech
theories
is
communication,
discourse
normative
because
addition,
guage are central to this enterprise. 3 7 Finally, what counts as a theory or explanation
of action may be extremely context dependent, raising the question of whether the goal
of research can be to develop a single theory of action.
Another issue for collaborative research is the relationship between norms and power,
an issue that most approaches based on a linguistic analogy or on the idea of communicative action, including Chayes and Chayes's "discursive justification," do not fully address.
The idea that identities, interests and international social structures are produced by
interaction on the basis of shared norms suggests that "power" consists of something
more than just material capabilities, but it does not tell us precisely what "power" means
or how it relates to the production of actors and shared meanings. The realist claim
that normative discourses offer mere "facade legitimation" for material power relations
is not a complete answer, because it fails to appreciate that "legitimation orjustification
always has a 'facade' aspect to it without this making it any less necessary."' 3 8 Research
and theorizing should focus on the subtle question of how power relations, on one hand,
and language, argument, norms and shared knowledge, on the other, intertwine and
implicate each other.1 39
Third, collaborative research should develop accounts of what counts as proofin normbased discourses: how is the effect of persuasion achieved and what role does persuasion
in a manner likely to produce those conditions. The first step in such research would be to analyze empirically
validated moments of "transformation" in specific international negotiations to generate a set of hypotheses
about why transformation takes place. For a claim that the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union
changed during the Cuban missile crisis as a result of the specific bargaining process undertaken by Kennedy
and Khrushchev, see Richard N. Lebow, Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargainitg,4 EUR.J.
INT'L REL. 31 (1998).
' See supra notes 40-42 and corresponding text, and notes 96-97 and corresponding text.
n See Ole Waever, John G. Ruggie: Transformationand Institutionalization,in FUTURE OF IR, supra note 34, at
170; Marlene Wind, Nicholas G. Onuf: The Rules ofAnarchy, in id. at 236; Erik Ringmar, Alexander Wndt: A Social
Scientist Struggling with History, in id. at 269.
" Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 30.
117 See, e.g., Ruggie, supra note 40, at 19; Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 9, 11; Wendt, supra note 40, at 411.
nKoskenniemi, Place of Law, supra note 99, at 477.
. Ruggie, supra note 40, at 42 (posing the question whether and how linguistic structures are implicated
in power relations). The issue can be and has been approached from many theoretical and methodological
perspectives. See, e.g., FRANcK, supra note 27 (norms and legitimacy as influences on state behavior); Rodney
Bruce Hall, Moral Authority as a Power Resource, 51 INT'L ORG. 591 (1997) (moral authority as a source of
political power in feudal Europe); Scott, supra note 102 (dominant ideology of international law as a form of
power); Chris Tennant, Indigenous Peoples, InternationalInstitutions, and the InternationalLegal Literaturefrom
1945-1993, 16 Hum. Rrs. Q. 1 (1994) (international legal discourse as a determinant of and constraint on
possibilities for identity and action).
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on the basis of norms play in contemporary world politics? 40 Among other things, this
IR theorists:
inquiry implicates one of the metatheoretical issues urged by constructivist
4
what should "count" as a test of knowledge in international affairs?' '
These questions are based, ultimately, on the idea that norms and other intersubjective
structures are "always in process." The goal of this research should be to develop
convincing accounts of precisely how such structures are continuously formed and transformed by discursive practice, and how they continuously set the 42terms by which actors
interpret their own and others' identities, interests, and actions.
4. Transformation of the Constitutive Structures of InternationalAffairs: How did the fundamental structuresof the system ofsovereign states emerge? What sustainsthese structures, and what
are the conditions for their transformation?How do these structures operate to limit or exclude
certain possibilitiesfor identity and action, while making others appear natural or necessary or
given?
Any investigation of the role of argument and persuasion on the basis of shared norms
must sooner or later take account of the fact that discursive practices are situated or
embedded in deeper normative structures, such as states, sovereignty and anarchy, that
constitute the organizing principles of the international system. One of the lasting, and
still-pertinent, questions for international studies concerns when and how transformation
occurs in the fumdamental social structures of international affairs.
Interdisciplinary research should enrich our understanding of how these fundamental
structures are ongoing products of practice. 43 Both IR and IL scholars have examined
how the fundamental categories of the international system are historically and culturally
contingent artifacts." 4 In political science, for example, John Ruggie has argued that
the emergence of modem sovereignty and territoriality represented a transformation of
the structure of the international system; Kathryn Sikkink has addressed lawyers on past
and present practices of sovereignty; and Jens Bartelson consciously skirts disciplinary
boundaries in a genealogical study of sovereignty.14 ' Both legal and IR scholars have
examined the contradictions and indeterminacy of the structures of international life.'4 6
of sovereignty has been
Moreover, numerous IL scholars have shown that demystification
47
a part of the culture of international law for decades.
As these comments might suggest, a central theme of joint research should be the
intellectual histories of the two disciplines, since the concepts that serve as the fundamental elements of our disciplinary self-understandings and enable the construction of mean" See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 8, at 488.

41See, e.g., Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 30.
' Cf Wendt, supra note 40.
',See id. at 413 ("The sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all
creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice.").
"' In IL, see, e.g., Antony Anghie, Franciscode Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of InternationalLaw, 5 Soc. &
LEG.L STUD. 321 (1996); Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair" European Nationalism and the
Modernist Renewal of InternationalLaw, 106 HAPV.L. REv. 1792 (1993).
1"
'See John G. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: ProblematizingModernity in InternationalRelations, 47 INT'L
ORG. 139 (1993); Kathryn Sikkink, Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: HistoricalPrecursors and Current
Practices, 19 Hous.J. INT'L L. 705 (1997); andJENs BARTELSON, A GENEALOGYOF SOVEREIGNTY (1993). See also
STATE SOVEREIG,NTAS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (ThomasJ. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996).
"" In IR,see, e.g., R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAS POLITIcAL THEORY (1993);
INTfERNATIONAL/INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS: POSTMODERN READINGS OF WORLD PoLrrIcs (James Der Derian &
Michael J. Shapiro eds., 1989); Richard Ashley & R.B.J. Walker, ReadingDissidence/Writingthe Discipline: Crisis
and the Question of Sovereignty in InternationalStudies, 34 INT'L STUD. Q. 367 (1990). In IL, see, e.g., MARTTI
KoSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGYTO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); and
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987).
7
" David Kennedy, Receiving the Internationa410 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (1994); see also Annalise Riles, The
iew from the InternationalPlane: Perspective and Scale in the Architecture of ColonialInternationalLaw, 6 LAw &
CRITIQUE 39, 53 (1995) (arguing that postmodem deconstruction was anticipated in international law scholarship as early as the 19th century).
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ing are themselves historically contingent formations.14 David Kennedy has broken
ground in international law by demonstrating how the meanings of fundamental terms
of the discipline change over time and give rise to styles and preoccupations that seem
bizarre to later observers.' 49 Some of the most interesting work in this genre traces
how each successive self-understanding of international law or international relations
naturalizes a new set of assumptions while denaturalizing an older set, and, more subtly,
the older set achieves the height of its coherence and solidity only in retroshows 15that
0
spect.
5. Government Networks: How do the regimes established by state units-administrativeagendes, courts, executives, legislators or legislative committees-differ from traditional regimes? Do
they serve different functions?Arise under different circumstances?Have different legal.properties?
Many have now documented the ways the regime theorists' account of the origins of
and functions performed by international institutions dovetail with the understandings
of those institutions developed by international lawyers. However, the insistence of liberal
IR theory on the "state as agent" and the concomitant disaggregation of the state into
the institutions that actually represent and regulate individuals and groups in domestic
and transnational society focus attention on a different type of international regime:
"government networks" created by state units. These networks themselves differ in terms
of relative formality and informality; some constitute transgovernmental organizations
that would easily qualify as an "institution" according to any political scientist's or
international lawyer's definition;"' 1 others qualify less as "rules, norms, principles, and
decision-making procedures" than as loose groupings of designated actors in routine
contact with one another over common concerns and problems. 152 Can they nevertheless
be analyzed by using the same conceptual apparatus applicable to interstate regimes?
More specifically, from a political science perspective, will the difference in decision
makers within the regime or network actually yield different policy outcomes? Do these
regimes address different types of problems? Are they subject to different constraints?
From a legal perspective, should state units have independent legal status in the international system? The answer will likely depend, at least in part, on whether state units
prove to diverge from the positions taken by the unitary state and thus reach different
policy outcomes. Assuming the answer is yes, however, should government units be
accorded independent legal status, at least for some purposes? How should we monitor
and regulate them as international decision makers? Should we be adopting more of a
legal process approach and replace substantive rules with procedural determinations
designed to shunt issues to specific decision makers?
Finally, how should we treat the rules generated by government networks? What are
their status and normative force? The Basel Committee, for instance, has developed a
set of core principles of sound banking regulation, which it hopes will be adopted by
central bankers around the world. Similarly, the IOSCO Technical Committee has re148 See Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 12.
49
' See, e.g., David Kennedy, PrimitiveLegalScholarship,27 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986); David Kennedy, The Move
to Institutions, 8 CARozo L. Ray. 841 (1987); David Kennedy, The InternationalStyle in PostwarLaw and Policy,
1994 UTAH L. REv. 7.
50 See, e.g., David Kennedy, InternationalLaw and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 65 NORDIC J.
INT'L L. 385 (1996); and Waever, supra note 34, at 9-10.
"' Examples include the Basel Committee of central bankers, the International Organization of Securities
Commissioners (IOScO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the Organization of the
Supreme Courts of the Americas. See David T. Zaring, InternationalLaw by Other Means: The Twilight Existence
of InternatiorialFinancialRegulatory Organizations,33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 281 (1998).
5
Examples in this category include informal contacts among government departments charged with the
oversight of competition policy, environmental policy, criminal law enforcement, labor policy, etc. Informal
contacts among judges from other countries would also qualify. See Slaughter, supra note 73.
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leased general standards for securities regulators. 53 Do such principles constitute customary international law? They are generated by state units rather than states and are
not intended to be binding in the usual sense. But the entities that generate them
comply not only in the belief that they represent an international consensus as to best
practice, but also out of a sense of commitment to their fellow regulators.
These questions can be approached from a wide range of theoretical perspectives.
Functionalist accounts in both law and political science will focus on rational incentives;
constructivist analyses may examine the extent to which government networks constitute
"epistemic communities" sharing critical epistemological assumptions and professional
values. Liberal theories, on the other hand, will emphasize the relationship between
state units and their social, economic and political constituencies. All three of these
approaches will benefit from a lawyer's probing ofwhether perceived differences between
government networks and conventional regimes should carry normative significance
and, if so, how to operationalize it.
6. Embedded Institutionalism:How can we enhance the "embeddedness" of internationalinstitutions in domestic society? Throughpartnershipswith domestic government institutions?By creating
channels for individuals and NGOs to bypass domestic governments and participate in these
institutions directly? Or both?
Scholars in both IR and IL are developing an approach that might be called "embedded Institutionalism": a focus on the domestic origins of international institutions and
the domestic possibilities for enforcing international rules.1'5 From this perspective,
international institutions are but the tip of a vast iceberg of relationships, calculations,
and processes of interest definition and identity formation below the surface of the state.
Theories of institutional formation, duration and impact must thus analyze domestic, as
well as international, politics and focus on the crucial interrelationship between the two
levels. From the IL side, a wide range of possibilities exist for strengthening formal and
informal links between international and domestic institutions in ways that blur the
distinction between international and domestic law and hence make international law
more enforceable.
A more concrete illustration of the possibilities raised by this agenda emerges from a
growing awareness of courts as quasi-autonomous actors in the international system. A
number of political scientists and EU legal scholars are examining the relationships
between the European Court ofJustice and national courts in various EU member states,
analyzing the ways in which those relationships have been critical to the construction of
the EU legal system.' 55 They are following the lead of legal scholars such as Joseph
Weiler and Hjalte Rasmussen, who first pointed to the role of national courts, but
"ROn the Basel Committee and 1OSCO, see supra note 151.
' Cf. John Ruggie's theory of "embedded liberalism," supra note 98, an account of the construction of
the postwar international trade regime that emphasizes domestic constraints on the formation and implementation of international rules.
"' See Karen Alter, The Making of a Rule of Law- The European Court of the National Judiciaries (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology);
Karen Alter, Who Are the Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court ofJustice, 52 INT'L
ORG. 121 (1998); Jonathan Golub, The Politics of JudicialDiscretion:Rethinking the Interaction Between National
Courts and the European Court ofJustice, 19 W. EUR.POL. (1996); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The
European Court and the NationalCourts: A StatisticalAnalysis ofPreliminaryReferences, 1961-95,J. Etw. PUB. POL'Y
(forthcoming 1998); THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXr
(Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet & Joseph H. H. Weiler eds., 1998); Dieter Grimm, The European
Court ofJustice and National Courts: The Ceman ConstitutionalPerspective After the MaastrichtDecision, 3 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 229 (1997); G. F. Mancini, The Role of the Supreme Courts at National and International Level: A
Case Study of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, paper presented at the International
Association of Procedural Law (May 1997).
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without systematically analyzing it. 156 Current doctrinal debates about the evolution of
"Kompetenz/Kompetenz" are tracking ongoing power struggles between national courts
and the ECJ that will have important implications for the next round of European
integration.
Beyond the European Union, both national and international courts are attracting
increased attention in terms of their actual or potential relationship with one another,
either as partners in enforcing international rules1 57 or as participants in a larger dynamic
process of socialization in the service of compliance. 58 Similar relationships could be
forged between administrative entities at the national and supranational levels, or even
legislative committees. International lawyers need to explore the design and implementation of facilitative procedural mechanisms, such as the Article 177 procedure in the EU
legal system, to create enduring links.
A final set of important and potentially fascinating questions concern the relationship
between international institutions and government networks. More precisely, it i,. possible
that domestic institutions will become more interested in and receptive to their counterpart international institutions as they begin to perform the same functions horizontally
rather than vertically. For instance, domestic judges, at least in the United Slates, are
beginning to articulate their responsibility to "help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony, rather than at cross purposes."' 59 Such cooperation includes not
only procedural mechanisms of deference and collaboration, but also substantive evaluation of the degree of convergence between domestic and foreign law. The U.S. court
must assess the sufficiency of the rights and remedies afforded a litigant under foreign
law as compared with U.S. law. In this calculus, "comparability" does not mean 1"equal60
ity" but, rather, a rough equivalence of ends often reached by different means.
The result is the judicial development of the principle of "legitimate difference." ' '
Such roles engage domestic courts in direct dialogue with foreign courts, in ways that
may ultimately enhance their receptivity to partnerships with supranational courts and
tribunals. Accepting the principle of legitimate difference could well dispose a particular
domestic court to give weight to a decision arrived at by an international tribunal that
had carefully canvassed multiple bodies of national law.
Embedded institutionalism extends beyond courts, of course. Another promising avenue for both theoretical research and practical prescription concerns the "nesting" of
government networks within more traditional international institutions. Within NAFrA,
for instance, networks of Canadian, American and Mexican environmental officials work
together in self-described "enforcement networks."1 62 Specialized governmental officials
I"See Weiler, supra note 21; HJALTE RAsMUssEN, ON LAW AND POICYIN THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OFJUDICIAL POLICY MAKING (1986).
157INTERNATIONAL LAw DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996);
Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 21, at 370-73, 308-12. See also sources cited on the European Court ofJustice
and national courts, supranote 155.
Iss
59 See Koh, TransrationalProcess, supra note 11.
' Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1991). The quoted language is from
Judge Breyer, who thusjustified the court's decision to dismiss, on forum non conveniens grounds, a case brought
by a U.S. plaintiff against a Canadian defendant in U.S. court. The court decided that the case would be
better heard by a Canadian court, notwithstanding the contrary expressed view of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, writing as an amicus.
'" See, e.g., Roby v. Corporation of Lloyds, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363-65 (2d. Cir. 1993) (choosing to let a case
proceed in England rather than the United States, notwithstanding significant differences in the mode and
content of securities regulation under English law, on the premise that "the available [English] remedies are
adequate" and "sufficient" to deter "British issuers from defrauding American investors").
"' Anne-Marie Burley, Law AmongLiberalStates: LiberalInternationalismand theAct of StateDoctrine,92 COLUM.
L. REv. 1907, 1919, 1946 (1992).
"62
Scott C. Fulton & Lawrence I. Sperling, The Network ofEnvironmentalEnforcementand Compliance Cooperation
in North America and the Western Hemisphere, 30 INT'L LAw. 111 (1996).
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in particular agencies have long been seconded to international institutions; the difference here is the conscious creation of a forum for national government officials to
come together in their national capacities but under the auspices of an international
institution. The result may be less friction between national and international institutions
and more integrated implementation of international rules and norms.
V. CONCLUSION

IR and IL have rediscovered one another. A new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship has emerged, reacknowledging that the disciplines represent different faces of
and perspectives on the same empirical and/or intersubjective phenomena. Outsiders
might categorize them as dividing the study of the international system in terms of
positive versus normative, politics versus law. Insiders in both disciplines reject such
facile distinctions. The reasons for the periodic divergence and reconvergence of the
two fields have had more to do with the internalization of external events such as the
Cold War and its end and the externalization of the internal dynamics of theory building
and purported paradigm shifting.
Regardless of mistakes past, and no doubt future, the wheel has come round again.
Scholars in both disciplines should profit from the moment to develop a genuinely
collaborative research agenda that will generate both practical and theoretical insights.
Many international lawyers and international relations scholars are speaking the same
language, or at least languages. They may not yet be speaking with one voice, nor should
they be. But each side is finding something to say, in a deepening and mutually profitable
conversation.
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